Alternatives

The Case for U.S. Housing

The Case for U.S. Housing View all 2 contributors

Executive Summary Skip Summary

  • U.S. Single Family Housing significantly lagged post-crisis recoveries compared to equities and commercial real estate. That relative underperformance, plus potential support from pent-up demand, augur well for housing.
  •  
  • In our opinion, median income-based measures suggesting that U.S. housing is overvalued are flawed.
  •  
  • U.S. housing is NOT a monolithic whole; it is a very heterogeneous asset class. New constructions sit next to 70-year-old homes, across a variety of sizes and price points. Digging deep into local factors (e.g., land supply constraints, income growth of upper middle class) is essential to better understanding and forecasting home prices.
  •  
  • We believe housing in Ohio, Illinois, Mississippi, Nevada and New Jersey is undervalued vs. local fundamentals and likely to outperform; while parts of Oregon, Texas, Hawaii and California are relatively overvalued and could lag income growth.

HOUSING SIGNIFICANTLY LAGGED THE RECOVERY IN STOCKS AND COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE

Leading up to the financial crisis, equities, commercial real estate (“CRE”) and single family home prices had appreciated by relatively similar amounts, rising approximately 50% from 2002 until cracks started to appear in housing in 2006 (Figure 1). In the aftermath of that last dip, however, asset prices recovered at vastly different speeds. Versus their previous peaks during 2006-2008, equities are approximately 35% higher (as measured by the S&P 500 Index), CRE is approximately 15% higher (as measured by the Moody’s Commercial Property Price Index), while housing lagged, at only a 5% increase (as measured by the S&P Case Shiller Home Price Index).

Over the longer term, since 2002, equity prices are up nearly 140% (translating into 6.7% per year growth over 13 years). During that same time, commercial real estate prices rose 5% per year and are now 90% higher. But U.S. home prices lagged significantly, growing less than 40%, implying a measly 2.5% annual growth rate.

FIGURE 1: U.S. single-family home price recovery is much weaker than stocks and CRE

Note: CPPI = Moody’s Commercial Property Price Index; SPCSHPI = S&P Case Shiller Home Price Index

Source: Bloomberg, S&P, Moody’s, Amherst Capital as of June 2016

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS CAST A LONG SHADOW ON HOUSING, CREATING LATENT DEMAND

The financial crisis had a much more lasting effect on the housing market than on other assets. Homeownership rates are lower (Figure 2) and we have observed that foreclosure-related issues have lingered almost a decade after the onset of the crisis. We believe that tainted borrower credit histories, a plethora of new regulation, and banks’ unwillingness to lend aggressively have kept mortgage credit very tight as compared to pre-crisis credit standards. Based on estimates from the Urban Institute, about 1 million purchase mortgages that would have been made using 2001 credit standards have not been made each year since 2009. They also estimate an additional 1.2 million loans were missing in 2014 (Figure 3).

We believe the national housing stock is also severely underbuilt versus pre-crisis norms, by an estimated 7.7 million homes or roughly 6% of existing housing stock (Figure 4). In dollar terms, that represents $2 trillion of unbuilt residential real estate. Based on the American Community Surveyi, 2010-2014 net new constructions accounted for just 1% of the housing stock. Even after adjusting for higher construction activity in 2015- 16, we believe there is remarkable under-construction versus pre-crisis norms.

BOTTOM LINE Both household formation and home construction activity have been well below pre-crisis norms. We believe that this level of activity is not sustainable in the long run, and creates a large reservoir of potential housing demand. First, many older millennials have been living with their parents much longer than before, but are likely to form new households as the economy improves. Second, a substantial number of 23-27 year-old millennials will hit prime household formation age in the coming years (Figure 5). Our view is that this positive demand dynamic along with muted construction activity post-crisis will boost home prices.

 

HOUSING NOT OVERVALUED
(AS SOME MARKET OBSERVERS SUGGEST)

Despite housing’s relative underperformance vs. other asset classes (such as equities and CRE) and what we have outlined above as the fundamental support from pent-up demand over the next few years, some market observers suggest that U.S. single family housing is starting to become overvalued. A few even warn of another bubble. Such conclusions broadly rely on measures of home price relative to median income, and in our opinion, are deeply flawed.

Marginal homebuyers tend to be from above-median-income households, and income of such households is a bigger driver of home prices than is median income. In our research, we find that areas with similar growth in median income can have very different home price returns. However, layering in average income growth can explain the divergence in returns (Figure 6). As an example, we compare San Jose, CA and Washington, D.C. over the past 25 years. 

FIGURE 6: Home price measures using median income alone are ineffective

Note: Amherst HPI, which better adjusts for distressed transactions, shows the same trend as the S&P Case Shiller HPI

Source: Bloomberg, S&P, U.S. Census Bureau as of April 2016, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Amherst Capital, June 2016

CASE STUDY: SAN JOSE, CA VS. WASHINGTON, D.C.

In 1991, at the beginning of our 25-year case study, both San Jose, CA and Washington, D.C. had very similar annual household median income levels (approximately $46-47K per year). Then over the 25 years, median incomes grew at a similar pace, about 3.2% annually in San Jose and 2.9% in Washington, D.C. However, San Jose home prices rose 5% annually, but only 3.3% in Washington, D.C. (Figure 7).

Interestingly, this discrepancy between income and home price growth fades away if we add average income into the mix. In 1991, both areas had comparable average incomes; San Jose at $74.7K vs. Washington, D.C. at $71.3K. Since then, average incomes rose 5% annually in San Jose compared to 3.6% in Washington, D.C. (Figure 8). Average income growth is much more in line with the pace of home price growth over the last 25 years, and explains HPA outperformance in San Jose over the long term. The data suggests that home prices are not driven by changes in income of the entire population, but by changes in the upper income households (who tend to be homebuyers).

Similarly, we believe that areas with land supply constraints have a much greater response to income growth than those having plenty of buildable land. This happens not just in cities such as San Francisco and Miami that are limited by topography or geography; but also in areas with regulatory limits on height or density of buildings and zoning codes. Thus accounting for buildable land supply constraints helps explain the decades-long outperformance of San Francisco, New York, Miami and Los Angeles.

HOUSING IS A HIGHLY HETEROGENEOUS ASSET CLASS (NOT A MONOLITHIC WHOLE)

While market observers (and parts of the media) often simplify and talk about U.S. housing as a whole, housing is really a very diverse asset class. The variations stem from a multitude of factors, including property age, size, price point, and even style. For the U.S. as a whole, 10% of the housing stock (in units) is priced over half a million dollars, while another 10% is at $50K or lower (Figure 9). While higher priced homes tend to be more concentrated on the coasts, there is much variation even within specific states (Figure 10). The median bucket in California is homes worth $300-500K while in Texas it is $100-150K. However, even California has a large number of homes priced below $150K, while in Texas there are a large number of homes above $300K. Similarly, there is a wide distribution of homes across other dimensions, such as age of construction (Figure 11) and size.

FIGURE 9: Cumulative distribution of housing stock (by price buckets, % units)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau “2014 American Community Survey,” Amherst Capital, June 2016

FIGURE 10: Cumulative distribution of housing stock – Texas and California (by price buckets, % units)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau “2014 American Community Survey,” Amherst Capital, June 2016

FIGURE 11: Distribution of Housing Stock (by age of construction, % units)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau “2014 American Community Survey,” Amherst Capital, June 2016

IMPORTANCE OF LARGE MARKETS IS SOMETIMES OVERSTATED

Market participants also sometimes overemphasize what is happening in certain key markets like New York or San Francisco. Yes, these markets do form a large part of the U.S. housing stock by value (Figure 12), but it is important to put things into perspective. While it is true that large Metropolitan Statistical Areas such as the one around New York City (spanning parts of NY/NJ/CT and PA) form a significant proportion of U.S. housing stock by value, even the top 20 MSAs only constitute approximately 50% of the value of U.S. housing stock, and only 40% of housing by number of units.iii It is important to consider (qualitatively, plus quantitatively drilling down in depth) all local variations in housing! An area appearing overstretched for some reason may catch the attention of the media, but that does not mean the same holds true across the country.

FIGURE 12: Distribution of housing stock – top 15 MSAs (% of total value)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Amherst Capital, as of 2010-2014 ACS Survey released in late 2015

FORECASTING HOME PRICES IS DEFINITELY A LOCAL MATTER

Forecasting U.S. home prices is less about a dazzling top-down U.S. macro analysis than it is about dissecting the tedious, nitty-gritty details at the granular level. A single national home price number is a fascinating metric and can receive extensive media attention, and is relevant in periods of highly correlated performance (as it was during the financial crisis). However, in today’s market, fundamentals and region-specific factors are likely to have a much larger impact. In fact, many regional markets that were highly correlated during the financial crisis have experienced vastly different recoveries since the bottom in prices (Figure 13).

FIGURE 13: Home price recovery from trough is very region-speci c (HPA, est. home value)

Average U.S. recovery since 2011 = 20% | Total value is approximately $35 trillion

Note: We show non-distressed home % price growth from the trough based on Amherst non-distressed HPI. The second number listed for each state shows our estimate of housing stock $ value based on census data.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Amherst InsightLabs, Amherst Capital as of April 2016

But the $35 trillion dollar question is: Can a granular analysis better predict future home prices? To evaluate this, we split U.S. metropolitan division area home price growth into a fundamental component (income growth, land supply constraints, household growth) and a short-term component (momentum, interest rates, credit availability). The fundamental component gives us a measure of sustainable home prices, in turn helping us develop insight as to an area being over or undervalued. Historically, this measure of fundamental value has done a good job in separating outperformers and underperformers. The 15 most undervalued areas from 2011 have appreciated approximately 6% per year on average, while the 15 most overvalued areas rose only 2% per year (Figure 14).

FIGURE 14: Fundamental value has been a good predictor of relative performance (last 5 years)

Note: The 15 most under and overvalued areas were selected based on Amherst InsightLabs’ April 2011 Fundamental HPI measure.iv

Source: Amherst InsightLabs, Amherst Capital as of April 2016

WHAT AREAS ARE UNDERVALUED CURRENTLY?

Applying our detailed analytical tools and processes to housing fundamentals at the metropolitan division level, we find that parts of Oregon, Texas, Hawaii and California are somewhat overvalued and we believe will lag income growth in those regions. On the other end of the spectrum, the most undervalued are in states like Mississippi, Illinois, Ohio, Nevada and New Jersey. Amherst Capital anticipates these undervalued areas to outperform regional income growth. Aggregated results for the U.S. states are shown in Figure 15.

FIGURE 15: HPI vs. fundamental value across U.S. states

U.S. HPI is under-valued by 8.2% 

Note: Negative numbers indicate HPI is undervalued vs. fundamentals, whereas positive numbers show overvalued areas

Source: Amherst InsightLabs’ Fundamental HPI Index, Amherst Capital as of April 2016

IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES

The comments provided herein are a general market overview and do not constitute investment advice, are not predictive of any future market performance, are not provided as a sales or advertising communication, and do not represent an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security. Similarly, this information is not intended to provide specific advice, recommendations or projected returns of any particular product of Amherst Capital Management LLC (Amherst Capital). These views are current as of the date of this communication and are subject to rapid change as economic and market conditions dictate. Though these views may be informed by information from publicly available sources that we believe to be accurate, we can make no representation as to the accuracy of such sources nor the completeness of such information. Please contact Amherst Capital for current information about our views of the economy and the markets. Portfolio composition is subject to change, and past performance is no indication of future performance.

Amherst Capital is a registered investment adviser and is an indirect majority-owned subsidiary of Standish Mellon Asset Management Company, LLC, which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation.

BNY Mellon Investment Management is an investment management organization, encompassing BNY Mellon’s affiliated investment management firms, wealth management organization and global distribution companies. BNY Mellon is the corporate brand of The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and may also be used as a generic term to reference the Corporation as a whole or its various subsidiaries generally.

This information is not investment advice, though may be deemed a financial promotion in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Accordingly, where used or distributed in any non-U.S. jurisdiction, the information provided is for Professional Clients only. This information is not for onward distribution to, or to be relied upon by Retail Clients.

 For marketing purposes only. Any statements and opinions expressed are as at the date of publication, are subject to change as economic and market conditions dictate, and do not necessarily represent the views of BNY Mellon or any of its affiliates. The information has been provided as a general market commentary only and does not constitute legal, tax, accounting, other professional counsel or investment advice, is not predictive of future performance, and should not be construed as an offer to sell or a solicitation to buy any security or make an offer where otherwise unlawful. The information has been provided without taking into account the investment objective, financial situation or needs of any particular person. BNY Mellon and its affiliates are not responsible for any subsequent investment advice given based on the information supplied. This is not investment research or a research recommendation for regulatory purposes as it does not constitute substantive research or analysis. To the extent that these materials contain statements about future performance, such statements are forward looking and are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties. Information and opinions presented have been obtained or derived from sources which BNY Mellon believed to be reliable, but BNY Mellon makes no representation to its accuracy and completeness. BNY Mellon accepts no liability for loss arising from use of this material. If nothing is indicated to the contrary, all figures are unaudited.

Any indication of past performance is not a guide to future performance. The value of investments can fall as well as rise, so investors may get back less than originally invested.

Not for distribution to, or use by, any person or entity in any jurisdiction or country in which such distribution or use would be contrary to local law or regulation. This information may not be distributed or used for the purpose of offers or solicitations in any jurisdiction or in any circumstances in which such offers or solicitations are unlawful or not authorized, or where there would be, by virtue of such distribution, new or additional registration requirements. Persons into whose possession this information comes are required to inform themselves about and to observe any restrictions that apply to the distribution of this information in their jurisdiction. The investment products and services mentioned here are not insured by the FDIC (or any other state or federal agency), are not deposits of or guaranteed by any bank, and may lose value.

This information should not be published in hard copy, electronic form, via the web or in any other medium accessible to the public, unless authorized by BNY Mellon Investment Management.

ISSUING ENTITIES

This information is approved for Global distribution and is issued in the following jurisdictions by the named local entities or divisions: Europe, Middle East, Africa and Latin America (excl. Switzerland, Brazil, Dubai): BNY Mellon Investment Management EMEA Limited, BNY Mellon Centre, 160 Queen Victoria Street, London EC4V 4LA. Registered in England No. 1118580. Authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. • Switzerland: Issued by BNY Mellon Investments Switzerland GmbH, Talacker 29, CH- 8001 Zürich, Switzerland. Authorized and regulated by the FINMA. • Dubai, United Arab Emirates: Dubai branch of The Bank of New York Mellon, which is regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority. This material is intended for Professional Clients only and no other person should act upon it. • Singapore: BNY Mellon Investment Management Singapore Pte. Limited Co. Reg. 201230427E. Regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. • Hong Kong: BNY Mellon Investment Management Hong Kong Limited. Regulated by the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission. • Japan: BNY Mellon Asset Management Japan Limited. BNY Mellon Asset Management Japan Limited is a Financial Instruments Business Operator with license no 406 (Kinsho) at the Commissioner of Kanto Local Finance Bureau and is a Member of the Investment Trusts Association, Japan and Japan Securities Investment Advisers Association. • Australia: BNY Mellon Investment Management Australia Ltd (ABN 56 102 482 815, AFS License No. 227865). Authorized and regulated by the Australian Securities & Investments Commission. • United States: BNY Mellon Investment Management. Securities are offered through MBSC Securities Corporation, distributor, member FINRA and a broker-dealer within BNY Mellon Investment Management. • Canada: Securities are offered through BNY Mellon Asset Management Canada Ltd., registered as a Portfolio Manager and Exempt Market Dealer in all provinces and territories of Canada, and as an Investment Fund Manager and Commodity Trading Manager in Ontario. • Brazil: this document is issued by ARX Investimentos Ltda., Av. Borges de Medeiros, 633, 4th floor, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil, CEP 22430-041. Authorized and regulated by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM).

The issuing entities above are BNY Mellon entities ultimately owned by The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation

BNY MELLON COMPANY INFORMATION

Investment Managers are appointed by BNY Mellon Investment Management EMEA Limited (BNYMIM EMEA) or affiliated fund operating companies to undertake portfolio management activities in relation to contracts for products and services entered into by clients with BNYMIM EMEA or the BNY Mellon funds.

BNY Mellon Cash Investment Strategies is a division of The Dreyfus Corporation. • Investment advisory services in North America are provided through four different SEC-registered investment advisers using the brand Insight Investment: Cutwater Asset Management Corp, Cutwater Investor Services Corp, Pareto New York LLC and Pareto Investment Management Limited. The Insight Investment Group includes Insight Investment Management (Global) Limited, Pareto Investment Management Limited, Insight Investment Funds Management Limited, Cutwater Asset Management Corp and Cutwater Investor Services Corp. This information does not constitute an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to purchase, any of the firms’ services or funds to any U.S. investor, or where otherwise unlawful. • BNY Mellon owns 90% of The Boston Company Asset Management, LLC and the remainder is owned by employees of the firm. • The Newton Group (“Newton”) is comprised of the following affiliated companies: Newton Investment Management Limited, Newton Capital Management Limited (NCM Ltd), Newton Capital Management LLC (NCM LLC), NCM LLC personnel are supervised persons of NCM Ltd and NCM LLC does not provide investment advice, all of which is conducted by NCM Ltd. Only NCM LLC and NCM Ltd offer services in the U.S. • BNY Mellon owns a 20% interest in Siguler Guff & Company, LP and certain related entities (including Siguler Guff Advisers LLC).

ENDNOTES

i. The American Community Survey (ACS) is an ongoing statistical survey by the U.S. Census Bureau. It regularly gathers information previously contained only in the long form of the decennial census (such as housing characteristics, income, employment, educational attainment, ancestry, language proficiency, migration, disability). This updated statistical information is usually available with a 1-2 year lag.

ii. Amherst Capital has an exclusive license with Amherst InsightLabs (“AIL”) in the asset management industry. AIL is an affiliate of Amherst Holdings, LLC.

iii. U.S. Census Bureau, Amherst Capital as of 2010- 2014 ACS Survey released in late 2015.

iv. Amherst InsightLabs’ Fundamental HPI is an estimate of sustainable home prices in a region based on fundamental drivers like income growth, household growth, homeownership and land supply constraints.

MARK-2016-11-23-0804