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Summaries of Selected Proxy Voting Guidelines.
The following are summaries of how the BNY Mellon Voting and Governance Policy Committee (the "Committee") generally views certain matters that are brought before the Committee in connection with the voting of proxies by those Member Firms who exercise voting discretion as a fiduciary for their clients. These summaries and the views reflected below by their nature are not intended to be complete and are not detailed explanations of all the guidelines and rule sets that the Committee uses to assist with the proxy voting process. The summaries below are published by the Committee to provide public company issuers and investors with a broad view of how the Committee approaches certain topics and proposals in the context of voting proxies for its Member Firms' fiduciary clients; and such summaries are not intended to limit in any way the Committee's or any Member Firm's actions with respect to its activities regarding the voting of proxies of any particular proposal or on shareholder voting matters generally.
Please refer to the Introduction section for an overview of the Committee, its philosophy, voting guidelines, process, and approach to conflicts of interest, and for the meanings of the capitalized terms used herein.
1. Boards and Directors
A. Election of Directors
The Committee believes that a majority of a company’s board members should be independent of management.
(i) Incumbent / Nominee Directors
The Committee generally votes FOR incumbent and nominee directors. However, the Committee generally votes to WITHOLD support in cases when individual directors (or the board, as applicable): (1) adopt, amend or renew a poison pill without shareholder approval or commitment to obtain shareholder approval within 12 months (applied to incumbent directors up for re-election at annual or special meeting which follows such action), (2) attend less than 75% of meetings for two consecutive years, (3) serve on more than six boards, (4) are CEOs of a public company and serve on more than 3 boards, or (5) fail to respond to approved shareholder proposals. In addition, the Committee generally votes to WITHOLD support when an incumbent or nominee director is also an executive officer (other than the CEO) of the company (e.g., CFO, COO, CAO); however the Committee will generally consider the proposal on a CASE-BY-CASE basis in situations when such incumbent or nominee director also owns 5% for more of the company’s outstanding stock.
(ii) Compensation Committee Members
Generally, the Committee votes FOR incumbent members of the compensation committee. However, the Committee will generally consider the proposal on a CASE-BY-CASE basis in situations where: (1) there are excise tax gross-ups, excise tax indemnification or “make whole” provisions in recent change-in-control or severance agreements, (2) the company’s stock performance is poor relative to peers and its compensation arrangements or pay practices is deemed excessive relative to peers, or (3) there appears to be an imbalance in a company’s long term incentive compensation plans between the performance-based and time-based awards for the executive officers.
(iii) Audit Committee
Generally, the Committee votes FOR independent incumbent members of an audit committee. However, the Committee will generally consider the proposal on a CASE-BY-CASE basis in situations where: (1) audit fees are either undisclosed or insufficiently disclosed such that the amount paid to the auditor for non-audit services cannot be determined, (2) a material weakness is disclosed and not remediated timely, or (3) non-audit fees exceed the sum of audit, audit-related and tax compliance/preparation fees.
(iv) Management Nominees
The Committee generally votes FORmanagement nominees for board or committee membership. In exceptional cases, such as severe governance concerns or when a Proxy Advisor recommends to withhold, the Committee will generally consider the proposal on a CASE-BY-CASE basis. If a nominee received less than majority support at the prior election and the board has not addressed the cause of that low support, the Committee will generally WITHHOLD its support.
B. Board Governance
(i) Classified Board
The Committee believes shareholders should annually vote for all members on a company’s board of directors. The Committee votes FOR requests to declassify the board and will generally vote AGAINST proposals to adopt or continue a classified board structure.
(ii) Board Independence
The Committee votes FOR management proposals for the election of independent directors that meet listing standards and generally favors an independent chairperson. Conversely, the Committee votes AGAINST shareholder proposals that are more or less restrictive than listing standards with respect to director “independence.”
(iii) Board Size
The Committee votes FOR management requests to configure the size of the board of directors with appropriate rationale, absent evidence of entrenchment or a disadvantage to shareholders. However, the Committee votes AGAINST proposals that remove the shareholders’ right to vote on board configuration matters, or that would give the board sole discretion to set the number of members.
(iv) Vote Majority and Removal
Generally, the Committee supports the practice of one share, one vote. As such, we vote FOR proposals to elect director nominees by the affirmative vote of the majority of votes cast at the annual or special meeting. The same practice is applied to proposals mandating the removal of a director upon a simple majority vote, such that the Committee votes AGAINST management proposals that require a supermajority vote for removal.
(v) Separate Chairman and CEO
Generally, the Committee votes FOR management proposals that propose to separate the positions of Chairman and CEO. However, the Committee generally votes AGAINST shareholder proposals to separate the Chairman and CEO positions if a lead or presiding director with appropriate authority is appointed; but is likely to vote FOR such a proposal if a lead or presiding director with appropriate authority has not been appointed. When considering the sufficiency of a lead or presiding director’s authority, the Committee will consider: whether the director: (1) presides at all meetings of the board (and executive sessions of the independent directors) at which the Chairman is not present, (2) serves as a liaison between the Chairman and the independent directors, (3) approves board meeting agendas, (4) has the authority to call meetings of the independent directors, and (5) if requested by major shareholders, ensures that s/he is available for consultation and direct communication.
2. Accounting and Audit
Generally, the Committee votes FOR the ratification of the board’s selection of an auditor for the company. The Committee will vote AGAINST the ratification of the auditors if there are concerns of negligence due to issuance of an inaccurate audit opinion. The Committee typically votes AGAINST shareholder proposals for auditor rotation arrangements that are more restrictive than regulatory requirements.
3. Anti-Takeover Measures
Generally, the Committee opposes proposals that seem designed to insulate management unnecessarily from the wishes of a majority of the shareholders and that would lead to a determination of a company’s future by a minority of its shareholders. However, the Committee generally supports proposals that seem to have as their primary purpose providing management with temporary or short-term insulation from outside influences so as to enable management to bargain effectively with potential suitors and otherwise achieve identified long-term goals to the extent such proposals are discrete and not bundled with other proposals.
A. Shareholder Rights Plan or “Poison Pill”
Generally, the Committee votes FOR proposals to rescind a “poison pill” or proposals that require shareholder approval to implement a “pill.” Further, a WITHHOLD support vote on the election of directors will follow the adoption or renewal of a poison pill without shareholder approval.
B. Non-net Operating Loss Shareholder Rights Plan
Generally, the Committee votes FOR non-net operating loss shareholder rights plans if all the following are in place: (1) a plan trigger that is 20% or greater, (2) a term not exceeding 3 years, (3) the plan terminates if not ratified by shareholder majority, (4) there are no “dead hand” or “modified dead hand” provisions, and (5) the plan has a qualified offer clause. The Committee generally reviews these NNOL plans on a CASE-BY-CASE basis outside of these prescribed requirements.
C. Special Meetings and Majority Vote
The Committee believes the rights to call a special meeting and to approve an action with a simple majority vote are powerful tools for shareholders. As such, we generally support proposals that uphold these rights. More specifically, with respect to calling a special meeting, the Committee generally votes FOR proposals that would allow shareholders to call a special meeting if a reasonably high proportion of shareholders (typically of at least 10-15%, depending on the company’s market capitalization, but no more than 25%, of the company’s outstanding stock) are required to agree before such a meeting is called.
For companies that currently permit shareholders of 25% or less of outstanding stock to call a special meeting (or no such right exists), the Committee may vote AGAINST proposals that would effectively lower (or initially establish) the minimum ownership threshold to less than 10% (for large cap companies) or 15% (for small cap companies). However, for companies that currently permit shareholders of greater than 25% of outstanding stock to call a special meeting (or no such right exists), the Committee is likely to consider on a CASE-BY-CASE basis those proposals that would effectively lower (or initially establish) the minimum ownership threshold to less than 10% (for large cap companies) or 15% (for small cap companies).
D. Written Consent
The Committee will generally vote FOR proposals to permit shareholders to act by written consent if the company does not currently permit shareholders to call for a special meeting or to act by written consent. The Committee will generally vote AGAINST proposals on written consent if the company permits shareholders the right to call for a special meeting.
E. Proxy Access
The Committee will generally vote FOR proposals to permit shareholders representing 3% of a company’s outstanding shares held for at least three years to nominate directors for up to 25% of the seats on the board. The Committee generally reviews on a CASE-BY-CASE basis all other proposals outside of these prescribed requirements.
4. Capital Structure, Mergers, Sales and Transactions
The Committee is likely to consider on a CASE-BY-CASE basis those proposals to merge, reincorporate or to affect some other type of corporate reorganization. In making these decisions, the Committee’s primary concern is the long-term economic interests of shareholders, and it will consider Member Firm opinions, the fairness opinion, and the Proxy Advisors’ vote recommendations when determining a vote decision on these or similar proposals.
B. Capital Structure
In assessing asset sales, reorganizations, bankruptcy or other capital structure changes, the Committee looks to the economic and strategic rationale behind the transaction and supports those proposals that reasonably can be expected to uphold or enhance the shareholders’ long-term economic interest.
(i)The Committee generally votes FOR stock split proposals if the purpose is to: (1) increase liquidity and/or (2) adjust for a significant increase in stock price.
(ii)The Committee generally votes FOR reverse stock split proposals if the purpose is to avoid stock exchange de-listing. The Committee also generally votes FOR proposals to decrease the number of common stock shares outstanding following reverse stock splits and proposals to eliminate unissued blank check preferred stock or a class of common stock with voting rights greater than the class held in client accounts.
C. Authorized Stock Increases
Generally, the Committee votes FOR proposals for the authorization to issue additional shares of common or preferred stock if it determines that the increase is: (1) not excessive relative to the industry’s average rate or otherwise harmful to the long-term economic interests of shareholders, or (2) necessary to avoid bankruptcy or to comply with regulatory requirements or other legally binding matters. The Committee will generally vote AGAINST such proposals that would exceed the industry’s average rate and/or the business purpose is not articulated sufficiently.
D. Preferred Stock Authorization
Where the voting power of the new issuance is specified as equal to or less than existing common stock shares, and the Proxy Advisors and the fairness opinion agree, the Committee generally votes FOR proposals to issue preferred stock. When the voting power of the new issuance is either unspecified or exceeds that of the existing shares of common stock, the Committee generally votes AGAINST proposals to issue preferred stock.
5. Corporate Governance
The Committee generally votes AGAINST proposals to continue or to adopt cumulative voting.
B Amend Bylaw, Charter or Certificate
Generally, the Committee votes FOR management proposals when the focus is administrative in nature or compliance driven and there is no evidence of negative impact to shareholder rights. If evidence suggests that proposals would result in a reduction of shareholder rights or lead to entrenchment, the Committee votes AGAINST such proposals.
C. Indemnity Liability Protection
Generally, the Committee votes FOR proposals to limit directors’ liability or expand indemnification on behalf of their service to the company. However, the Committee votes AGAINST proposals that support indemnification for director actions conducted in bad faith, gross negligence or reckless disregard of duties.
D. Adjourn Meeting
In cases where the Committee is supportive of the underlying transaction or proposal and the purpose of the adjournment is to obtain additional votes, the Committee will vote FOR the adjournment.
6. Proxy Contests
In the case of proxy contests, the Committee will endeavor to provide both parties an opportunity to present their case and arguments before determining a course of action.
The Committee’s general policy is to consider: (1) the long-term economic impact of the decision, (2) the company’s record and management’s ability to achieve our reasonable expectations for shareholder return, (3) overall compensation for officers and directors and share price performance relative to industry peers, (4) whether the offer fully realizes the future prospects of the company in question with the likelihood of the challenger achieving their stated goals, and (5) the relevant experience of all board nominees.
7. Social, Ethical and Environmental
The Committee reviews all management sponsored social, ethical and environmental responsibility proposals on a CASE-BY-CASE basis. Generally, the Committee considers various factors in voting decisions, including: (1) the long-term economic impact including implementation cost-to-benefit considerations, (2) the company’s current legal and regulatory compliance status, (3) the binding or advisory nature of the request, and (4) whether the proposal’s underlying objective is within the scope of the company’s influence and control.
The Committee generally votes FOR shareholder sponsored proposals when the proposal reasonably can be expected to enhance long-term shareholder value and when management fails to respond meaningfully to the proposal. The Committee generally votes AGAINST shareholder proposals when management has responded meaningfully and there is no evidence of: (1) shareholder value creation, (2) regulatory non-compliance, (3) failed oversight from the board and management for the subject activity, (4) the company is operating outside of industry standard practice, or (5) the proposal request is vague or overly restrictive and unlikely to achieve the underlying intent.
8. Compensation and Benefits
A. Equity Compensation
The Committee employs a shareholder value transfer model to measure the value transfer from shareholders to employees and directors when considering equity compensation proposals.
The Committee generally votes FOR proposals relating to equity compensation plans that: (1) pass our shareholder value transfer model and prohibit share re-pricing without shareholder approval, (2) pass our shareholder value transfer model, are silent on share re-pricing and the company has no history of re-pricing, (3) use section 162(m) rules for plan administration by independent directors, or (4) require an issuance of stock or options as equal payment in lieu of cash to directors.
The Committee generally votes AGAINST compensation plans that: (1) fail our shareholder value transfer model and allow for option exchange or re-pricing without shareholder approval, (2) pass our shareholder value transfer model but permit accelerated vesting without consummation of a change-in-control transaction, or (3) serve as a vehicle to perpetuate a disconnect between pay and performance or favors executive officers whose pay is already significantly higher than peers.
The Committee reviews on a CASE-BY-CASE basis those proposals that:
(i) pass our shareholder value transfer model and either (1) the plan is “silent” on re-pricing and the company has a history of the practice, or (2) a Proxy Advisor recommends an “against” vote; or
(ii) fail our shareholder value transfer model but the plan (1) is required to complete a transaction supported by the Committee or (2) includes details regarding extenuating business circumstances.
B. Say on Pay
If the ballot seeks an advisory vote on the frequency of say-on-pay proposals, the Committee generally votes FOR proposals that call for say-on-pay on an ANNUAL basis.
The Committee will generally vote FOR management proposals on say-on-pay. However, the Committee will generally consider the proposal on a CASE-BY-CASE basis in situations where: (1) there are excise tax gross-ups, excise tax indemnification or “make whole” provisions in recent change-in-control or severance agreements, (2) the company’s stock performance is poor relative to peers and its compensation arrangements or pay practices is deemed excessive relative to peers, (3) the company fails to address compensation issues identified in prior meetings when adequate opportunity to address has passed, or (4) there appears to be an imbalance in a company’s long term incentive compensation plans between the performance-based and time-based awards for the executive officers.
C. Option Re-pricing or Exchange
Generally, the Committee believes that stock compensation aligns managements’ and shareholders’ interests based on fair-market value grants.
In cases where management is proposing to address a compensation misalignment, the Committee generally votes FOR such proposals that: (1) seek exchanges that are value-for-value, (2) exclude executives, directors and consultants, (3) do not recycle exercised options, and/or (4) involve current options that are significantly under water and the new exercise price is reasonable. The Committee generally votes FOR proposals that require stock option exchange and re-pricing programs to be put to shareholder vote.
In cases of proposals where the exchange and/or re-pricing requests do not meet these criteria, the Committee generally votes AGAINST the management proposal.
D. Golden Parachute Plans
In reviewing management compensation agreements, the Committee generally votes FOR those that: (1) involve payments that do not exceed three times the executive’s total compensation (salary plus bonus), (2) have a double trigger, and (3) do not provide for a tax gross-up in the contract. Conversely, the Committee generally votes AGAINST compensation agreements that do not adhere to these requirements. As a facet of a capital structure change, the Committee will consider these compensation agreements on a CASE-BY-CASE basis.
In reviewing shareholder proposals, we generally support those that require the company to submit compensation agreements to a vote.
When determining the effectiveness of a company’s clawback/recoupment policy, the Committee will consider: (1) the amount of information the company provides in its proxy statement on the circumstances under which the company recoups incentive or equity compensation, (2) whether the company’s policy extends to named executive officers and other senior executive officers (and not simply the CEO and CFO), (3) if the policy requires recoupment of incentive and equity compensation received and subsequently determined to have been “unearned” during the prior 3-year period, and (4) if the policy considers performance-based compensation to be “unearned” if the corresponding performance target(s) are later determined to have not been achieved for any reason (rather than first requiring evidence of “misconduct” or fraudulent activity and/or a formal restatement of financial results).
F. Other Compensation Requests
Generally, the Committee votes FOR stock purchase plans that allow a broad group of employees to purchase shares and limit the discount to 15% or less. Conversely, the Committee generally votes AGAINST proposals that are limited to senior executives and/or provides for a discount that is greater than 15%.
Generally, the Committee votes FOR proposals that seek management and director retention of stock awards for no more than one year and/or 25% of stock awarded. Conversely, the Committee generally votes AGAINST proposals that seek retention of stock awards for greater than one year and 75% of stock awarded.
The BNY Mellon Proxy Voting and Governance Committee
The Committee seeks to vote on proxies of non-U.S. companies through application of the Voting Guidelines.
The Committee seeks to make proxy voting decisions that are in the best interest of the clients of its Member Firms.
The Committee has retained the services of two independent proxy advisors ("Proxy Advisors") to provide the Committee with comprehensive research, analysis and voting recommendations.
It is the policy of the Committee to make proxy voting decisions that are solely in the best long-term economic interests of the clients of its Member Firms.
If public company issuers or their senior management have questions.